As poor countries deplete their natural resources, for increased consumption to be sustainable some of the revenues should be invested in other public assets. Further, since such countries typically have acute shortages of public capital, the finance from resource depletion is an opportunity for needed public investment. Using a new global panel dataset on public capital and resource rents covering the period 1970 to 2005 we find that, contrary to these expectations, resource rents significantly and substantially reduce the public capital stock. This is more direct evidence for a policy-based 'resource curse' than the conventional, indirect evidence from the relationships between resource endowments, growth and income. The adverse effect on public capital is mitigated by good economic and political institutions and worsened by GDP volatility and ethnic fractionalization. Rents from depleting resources have more adverse effects than those that are sustainable. Our main results are robust to a variety of controls, and to instrumental variable estimation using commodity price and rainfall as instruments, Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, as well as across different samples and data frequencies.
Introduction
Inadequate public capital is a defining feature of poor countries. Some types of public capital directly contribute to living conditions so that shortage impairs wellbeing; other types are complementary to private capital so that shortage curtails private investment. Poor countries governments are insufficiently creditworthy to finance the investment necessary to redress these shortages. However, for some of them the conjunction of high global commodity prices and natural resource discoveries can provide a major new source of finance. The governments of these countries possess legal entitlement to the rents generated by the depletion of natural assets. They have the opportunity to tax the rents and use the revenues to transform the public capital stock. Not only is such a use of resource rents a political opportunity, it is also economically prudent. Since the revenues from the depletion of natural assets are intrinsically unsustainable, a society that fails to devote a substantial part of them to the accumulation of other assets risks suffering declining consumption. Van der Ploeg and Venables (2011) formally analyze how a poor, growing economy should optimally use depleting resource rents and show that they should indeed in part be devoted to public capital accumulation.
It might therefore be expected that in the course of development, those countries wellendowed with natural resources would choose to accumulate larger stocks of public capital. In this paper we use a new dataset to test this proposition. We show that on the contrary, the possession of rents from natural resource depletion has typically significantly reduced public capital. This fills in an important missing link in the analysis of the 'resource curse'. To date, the consequences of natural resource endowments have been analyzed through their effects on overarching economic outcomes such as the growth of output and the level of income, the results generally being ambiguous. However, natural resources can affect these outcomes through many channels which depend upon multiple decision takers. An advantage of focusing on public capital is that there is a single clear mechanism: resource rents directly generate revenue for governments and public capital is directly under government control. If, instead of using some of these revenues to increase the capital stock governments actually reduce it, this can reasonably be regarded as a policy error -a 'curse'. Despite such an error, natural resource endowments might nevertheless raise growth or incomes, for example by attracting foreign investment, so that these higher level outcomes would be misleading diagnostics of whether the political process was delivering flawed economic decisions.
We use a new global panel dataset on public capital and resource rents covering the period 1970 to 2005 and 45 developed and developing countries to test how resource rents are used. In addition to using aggregate measures of public capital, we are also able to test the relationship between resource rents and telephone networks, resource rents and rail networks, and resource rents and road networks. We find strong evidence of resource curse in public capital even after controlling for country fixed effects and time varying common shocks. Our instrumental variables estimates using international commodity price as an instrument also confirm the said relationship between natural resource rents and public capital. In particular, we find that a one standard deviation (2.69) increase in log resource rents per capita leads to approximately a one third of a standard deviation (25.09) decline in public capital stock in an average country. In other words, Brazil, approximately the mean resource rich country in our sample with rent as a share of GDP of 2 percent would experience a reduction in public capital stock to GDP ratio by 8 percentage points from a period average of 37 percent to 29 percent. We also find that precisely contrary to the dictates of prudent economic management, the depleting 'point source' resource rents reduce public capital rather than resource rents from potentially sustainable forestry and agriculture. This pattern remains unaltered when 'resource abundance' measures such as subsoil wealth, land wealth, and forest wealth are used. Our main results hold when we control for income and various additional covariates. It is also robust to various alternative samples. Consistent with these effects on the public capital stock being policy errors, using measures of institutions, GDP volatility, and ethnic fractionalization we find that good economic and political institutions limit the curse whereas GDP volatility and ethnic fractionalization magnifies it.
In the past, most studies of public capital were restricted to a sample of 22 OECD countries and cross-section data due to the paucity of data (Kamps, 2006) . The novelty of our study is that we use a new global panel dataset on public capital developed by Arslanalp et al. (2010) which includes both OECD and developing countries. The usage of panel data allows us to tackle endogeneity issues, omitted variable bias relatively effectively and limit bias originating from sample selection.
Furthermore, by merging the new global panel dataset on public capital with a global panel dataset on resource rents developed by Hamilton and Clemens (1999) we are able to empirically test the effect of resource rents on public capital in a global panel. This, to the best of our knowledge, is entirely new. Using measures of institutions, GDP volatility, and ethnic fractionalization we are also able to explore the channels through which resource rents may have an impact on public capital.
Our paper is related to a large literature on public investments and growth. This literature assesses whether public investments are productive and growth promoting. Some of the early empirical studies by the IMF produced no clear cut results (IMF, 2004; . World Bank (2007) in contrast found positive growth effects of public spending on infrastructure, education and health.
In a related paper Keefer and Knack (2007) deal with the political economy of public investments.
Using a cross-section dataset of 89 countries they show that public investment as a share of GDP and as a share of total investment is higher in countries with bad institutions. They argue that weak institutions in general and weak property rights in particular enhance rent seeking incentives of politicians which lead to an increase in public investment. In a recent study, Arslanalp et al. (2010) comment that the mixed results noticed in this literature are due to the usage of the public investment rate as an explanatory variable as opposed to the rate of change in public capital. They observe that studies using the latter variable often come up with a positive result. They argue that the public investment and public capital variables can differ substantially for a country depending on the initial level of the public capital stock. Therefore, the empirical results could be substantially different for these two variables. Romp and de Haan (2007) presents a comprehensive review of this literature. None of the above studies however look at the relationship between resource rents and public capital.
Finally, our paper is related to the resource curse literature. Warner (2001, 2005) note that resource rich countries on average grow much slower than resource poor countries.
Subsequent studies have argued that natural resources may lower the economic performance because they strengthen powerful groups and foster rent-seeking activities (e.g., Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Collier, 2000; Torvik, 2002) . Others have argued whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing depends on country-specific circumstances especially institutional quality (eg., Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Collier and Goderis, 2007; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010a,b) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses measurement issues relating to public capital and resource rent. Section 3 presents the empirical evidence on the relationship between resource rent and public capital. Section 4 concludes.
Measuring Public Capital and Resource Rent
Most of the existing empirical studies on public investment and growth use the public investment rate as a measure of public investment as opposed to the rate of change in public capital. The limitation of using the former is that it is dependent on the initial level of the capital stock and could vary significantly from the latter for a particular country. This could bring in systematic measurement error and potentially bias the results.
In this study we use a new global panel dataset on public capital developed by Arslanalp et al. (2010) which includes both OECD and developing countries. The original dataset covers 48 developed and developing countries and the period 1960 to 2007. Here however we are able to use data for 45 countries and the period 1970 to 2005 because our resource rent dataset only covers as many countries and years. Arslanalp et al. (2010) follow the methodology used in Kamps (2006) 4 to build a capital stock series. Their series is based on the perpetual inventory equation
, where for each country i, is the stock of public capital at time t, is public investment spending at time t-1, and is country i's time-varying rate of depreciation of the capital stock.
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Using the Arslanalp et al. (2010) public capital measure has the following advantages. First, the public capital measure allows us to effectively address endogeneity concerns. The public investment rate could be influenced by the business cycle. It could even turn negative due to a lack of revenues in an economy faced with an economic downturn. Often it is the first expenditure item to be cut down during a recession. In contrast, the public capital stock could be independent of business cycle fluctuations as it is measured at the beginning of the period. Second, the panel nature of the dataset allows us to effectively tackle omitted variable concerns by controlling for country
Using data for 48 countries on total investment and GDP from the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 6.2 and applying public and private investment shares from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database to disaggregate total investment into public and private Arslanalp et al. (2010) create the panel dataset on public capital which is the largest available for developing countries.
fixed effects and time varying common shocks. It also allows us to limit potential sample selection bias as we use a larger sample with both country and time variations. Third, it is also the largest available dataset for developing countries.
We notice in figure 1 that the 1970s experienced maximum public capital growth for all countries with the stock growth rate of 6.6 percent for middle income countries (MICs). In contrast, the 1990s witnessed an overall decline in public capital stock growth as more and more countries resorted to globalization and liberalization and perhaps moved away from public capital and towards accumulation of private capital. Public capital stock growth in low income countries (LICs) improved significantly during the first decade of the twenty first century. This is perhaps explained by the fact that low income countries experienced relatively steady growth during this decade while growth in the OECD member countries were badly affected by the global financial crisis. The rent from a particular commodity is defined as the difference between its world price and average extraction costs both expressed in current US dollars. The world price of a particular commodity is global and only varies over time. The extraction costs however are variable over time and across countries. We calculate total rents accruing from a variety of natural resources by following a three step procedure. First, we multiply the natural resource rent per unit of output of a particular commodity by the total volume extracted of that commodity. Second, we aggregate them across commodities for a country and a particular year. Third, we divide them by total population and average them for five year periods and take natural logs to smooth out any noise in the data. Averaged over the sample period, 7 Hamilton and Clemens (1999) provide a detailed description of this dataset. 
Testing for a Curse

Empirical Strategy
We start by plotting the change in public capital (
) against the change in resource rent ( it RR ' ) in figure 2. We find that public investment is typically lower in resource rich countries as there is a significant negative pattern in the data when we draw a line through it. In order to explore whether the negative correlation reported in figure 2 We are mainly interested in the effect of a change in it RR on of natural resources on the change in public capital stocks (public investments).
There may be issues of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. The stock of public capital may influence the cost of resource extraction and hence natural resource rent. The stock of public capital could also influence the level of income. To address such concerns we use the following two strategies. First, we use lagged resource rent. It is less likely that the current public capital stock would influence lagged resource rent. Second, we use international commodity prices and rainfall as instruments for resource rent and log GDP per capita and estimate the model using the Fuller version of Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) instrumental variable (IV) method.
The advantage of using Fuller LIML over standard IV estimator is that the former works better even when the instruments are weak. International commodity prices depend on global demand for commodities and hence are exogenous. They are also correlated with resource rent and may not have any effect on public capital stock through channels other than public capital. Therefore it is a valid instrument for resource rent. Rainfall is geography-based and hence exogenous to the model.
It is also correlated with income and could serve as a good instrument. To address omitted variable concerns, we control for country fixed effects and time dummy variables. Country fixed effects control for country specific time invariant observables which may influence both public capital and resource rent. Time dummy variables control for shocks that are time varying and common to all countries. Furthermore, we also control for many additional covariates in table 6. Table 2 presents our main results on the public capital resource curse. In column 1 we look at the unconditional correlation between resource rents and public capital. We notice a statistically significant negative relationship. Similar to figure 2 this suggests that resource rents are associated with low levels of public capital stock. But this association may be driven by omitted factors (such as income, time invariant institutions, legal origin, culture, geography, time varying common shocks etc.) influencing both resource rents and public capital stock. To tackle this issue in column 2 we add log per capita income. We notice that the negative relationship survives, but the magnitude of the coefficient falls marginally. In column 3 we further control for country dummies and year dummies. The strong statistically significant negative relationship survives indicating a public capital resource curse. Figure 3 plots this partial effect. In column 4, we address concerns of endogeneity by using 5 it 
Is there a Curse?
RR
instead of it RR . We continue to find support for the curse thesis. To convince ourselves even further that we have addressed endogeneity concerns adequately, we adopt the Fuller LIML IV estimation strategy in column 5. We use international commodity price and rainfall as instruments for resource rent and income respectively. We continue to find evidence of a curse in our 45 country panel dataset. Table 3 reports the first stage regressions where commodity price and rainfall are noticed to be highly significantly correlated with resource rent and GDP per capita. They are also not weak instruments as they satisfy the Stock-Yogo criteria (see column 5, A further concern of endogeneity stems from the possibility of a mechanical effect between resource rent and our preferred public capital measure G it K . Our preferred public capital measure is normalized by GDP. Therefore it is possible that we are picking up a positive correlation between resource rent and GDP. If resource rich countries are prosperous with a higher GDP then our preferred public capital measure would be mechanically lower for resource rich countries. This would lead us to an erroneous conclusion of public capital resource curse. To eliminate the possibility of such mechanical effect, we use log public capital as our dependent variable in column 7. Note that log public capital is not normalized by GDP and is representative of the aggregate public capital stock in a country. We find that the negative effect of resource rent on public capital survives leading us to conclude that we are indeed picking up a public capital resource curse.
To put the estimates of our main specification (column 3) into perspective, let us focus on percentage points (i.e., one third of a sample standard deviation of 25.09) decline in public capital stock in an average country. Table 11 reports additional calculations on the impact of natural resources on public capital in the average resource rich country in our sample.
Finally, in column 6 we test the impact of resource rent on public investment by estimating a dynamic model using the Arellano and Bond GMM estimation method. This estimation method uses lagged levels of the dependent variable and explanatory variables as instruments. We notice that the coefficient of interest remains significant suggesting public investment resource curse.
Point Source Resources, Public Capital and the Curse
Countries exporting point source natural resources (minerals, oil and gas) are doubly disadvantaged in terms of growth when compared with countries exporting relatively less appropriable natural resources such as agricultural produce (Isham et al., 2005) . Politicians in point source resource dependent countries could easily appropriate resource revenues and breed corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010a) . This would be harmful to growth. Furthermore, point source resource dependency could result into high inequality which could also harm growth.
In resources. In other words, non-renewable point source resources reduce public capital rather than potentially sustainable forestry and agriculture. In column 3 we control for both resources separately and arrive at a qualitatively similar empirical result. This may be due to the differential impact that point source resources have on institutions (Isham et al., 2005) . Furthermore, it may also be due to the permanent nature of price shocks in mineral and hydrocarbon resources as opposed to temporary shocks in case of agricultural produce. Permanent price shocks in point source resources may often lead to a permanent adverse terms of trade shocks disadvantaging public investments. To test that in column 4 we restimate the model in column 3 using annual data. We find that results are similar as when using five year averages. This similarity suggests that the absence of a curse in case of forestry resource rents is probably not driven by a more temporary nature of price shocks. To be certain that our main result is not driven by the durability of price shocks, in table 8 we further estimate our baseline specification (column 3, table 2) using the main aggregate resource measure ( it RR ) with different data frequencies. We get similar results with annual data, three year averages, and decadal averages as with five year averages. This suggests that our curse result is not driven by the durability of the price shocks.
To explore the variable effects of different types of natural resources further, in columns 5 -7 we look at the impact of 'resource abundance'. We use subsoil wealth, land wealth and forest wealth as measures of 'resource abundance'. These measures are available as a cross-section from the World Bank's Natural Capital dataset. The 'resource abundance' measures are likely to reflect resource stocks which is independent of economic flows and 'resource dependence'. We find evidence of curse in case of subsoil wealth (column 5) but not in case of land wealth (column 6) and forest wealth (column 7). The subsoil wealth result survives when all three variables are used in the same regression in column 8.
The Role of Institutions, Volatility and Ethnic Fractionalization
A large literature suggests that the resource curse is conditional on the quality of institutions (e.g., Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010a,b) . Resource rich countires with good economic and political institutions are unlikely to suffer from the curse. The curse however holds for resource rich countries with weak institutions.
In column 1 of table 5 we test the impact of political institutions measured by the POLITY2 democracy index from the Polity IV dataset. We find that the negative impact of resource rent on public capital gets moderated by the quality of democratic institutions. In other words, even though the coefficient on it RR is negative and strongly significant, the coefficient on the interaction term Our result of a curse conditional on the quality of institutions remains unaltered.
A large literature starting from the seminal contribution by Ramey and Ramey (1995) suggest that volatility is bad for growth. 9 GDP volatility could give rise to volatile government revenue and as a result very volatile public investment. Therefore, GDP volatility could potentially magnify the curse. In column 4, we test empirically how GDP volatility may impact on the curse.
We construct a GDP volatility series by following a two step procedure. First, we estimate an empirical growth model with investments and population growth as explanatory variables using dynamic panel data estimation technique (Arellano -Bond GMM). Second, we extract the residual from this regression and use the squared residual as our measure of volatility.
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The other closely related thesis of resource curse is the 'voracity effect'. Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) argue that in ethnically fractionalized countries powerful ethnic groups dynamically interact through a fiscal process. In the event of a resource windfall or a terms of trade shock the country could experience more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution in favour of the powerful group thereby damaging growth. Such a fiscal adjustment process in the event of a resource price shock in a resource rich economy could potentially damage public investments. In column 5, we test this thesis by using ethnic fractionalization as a control variable and We find that a one sample standard deviation (25.18) increase in GDP volatility in an average country increases the curse by 3.5 percentage points. as the interaction term. Note that ethnic fractionalization is time invariant and therefore we estimate a cross-section regression. We find that ethnic fractionalization does aggravate the curse which supports the 'voracity effect' thesis.
9 See Blattman et al. (2007) for an account on the recent contributions on this topic. 10 Note that we have also used a simple five year GDP variance as a measure of volatility and our results are similar.
Robustness
In table 6 we add additional covariates into our main specification to address the issue of omitted variables. In columns 1-3 we add foreign direct investments, a trade liberalization index, and trade shares, respectively as additional control variables. Trade liberalization and foreign investments help ease control over the import of vital capital goods which could be crucial for public investments. We find in column 3 that trade has a positive and significant impact on public capital.
In columns 4-5 we control for schooling and income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient.
Schooling should increase the demand for public goods and hence public capital. It could also have a positive impact on public capital from the supply side as a better educated population and bureaucracy would be better able to support high quality public investments. High inequality in contrast could increase redistributive pressure on the government jeopardizing public investments.
In columns 6 and 7 we control for terms of trade and changes in the real effective exchange rate to buy government bonds which would lead to higher interest rates. This is often characterized as sterilized intervention. As a result of high interest rates (cost of borrowing) the stock of public capital could be lower in resource rich countries. If the curse is working exclusively through the interest rate channel, then adding the real interest rate into our specification would make the coefficients on it RR statistically insignificant. However, as shown in column 8, these coefficients remain statistically highly significant. Our main results survive in all other instances. 
Varieties of Public Capital and the Curse
one at a time from our base sample. In column 6 we test the influence of OECD countries by excluding them from the sample. In columns 7-9 we also omit influential observations using Cook's distance, DFITS, and Welsch distance formulas respectively. In column 9, we drop major oil producers (Canada, Egypt, Mexico, and Norway) from our sample. Our main results hold in all these alternative samples.
So far our measure of public capital has been derived from expenditure adjusted for depreciation. and 4, with a higher score reflecting better public investment management performance. The aggregate index is a weighted average of these four stages with equal weights. Using this Index as a measure of the quality of the public investment process, we now investigate whether it is affected by resource rents (Table 9 ). In column 1 we use the composite index as the dependent variable.
Unfortunately, because the Index is recent it is as yet merely a one-time snapshot and so we are not able to control for country fixed effects. However, controlling for per capita income, we find a strong negative relationship between the quality of the investment process and resource rents. In columns 2-5, we use different components of the index (appraisal, selection, implementation, and evaluation) to test which component is most affected. We find that all stages of public investment management are negatively affected by resource rents. The coefficients are significantly negative in all cases except appraisal (column 2). These results suggest that the reduction in expenditure on public capital caused by resource rents may even be amplified by deterioration in the quality of the investment process.
To investigate the link to the actual capital stock further we turn to some evidence on a few components which are readily observable over time, namely telephone lines and networks of road and rail. Even though in many countries these assets are no longer publicly owned, until recently they were considered to be strategic and were owned by the government.
Controlling for country fixed effects and year dummies we find evidence that resource rents have significant, although modest effects (Table 10 ). In columns 1 and 2 we consider the telephone network: resource rich countries on average have significantly fewer telephone lines per hundred people. In columns 3 and 4 we look at the association between resource rents and rail and road networks. Resource rents are positively related to the rail network but negatively related to the road network. The former is perhaps best explained by the fact that resource extraction needs railways to transport ores to ports and so investment in extraction has historically often been combined with investment in railways. Road networks however are a different matter. Road networks are more closely related to the non-resource sector and perhaps suffer from the curse due to the neglect of the non-resource sector in general by the government in a resource rich country (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010b) .
While the evidence on telephone and road networks is qualitatively consistent with our overall results that resource rents reduce the public capital stock, the scale of the effect falls far short of what is implied by our other results. The contrast is brought out in Table 11 where we consider the counterfactual of the public capital stock in the average resource rich country were it not to have had any resource rents. Such a counterfactual is, of course, highly stylized, but for illustrative purposes we hold constant at the mean for our sample of resource rich countries all observed characteristics other than the resource rents themselves and our measures of public capital (See Appendix 2 for details of these variables). We find that in the absence of resource rents the average resource rich country would have had a 30 percentage point increase in the ratio of its public capital stock to GDP. However, what all these counterfactuals agree on is that the depletion of resource rents does not augment the public capital stock. This, rather than the absolute adverse effects, is the crux of the policy problem: natural capital has typically been plundered by the state rather than converted to more productive forms of capital.
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the impact of resource rents on public capital in resource rich countries. Natural resource rents provide an opportunity for resource rich developing countries to acquire public capital crucial for economic development. Further, since the depletion of natural assets is unsustainable, societies should offset such depletion by the accumulation of other forms of capital, of which public capital is most directly under the control of government. While the overall net effects of natural resource endowments on economic growth and the level of income are a priori ambiguous, it is unambiguous that some of the revenues from resource depletion should be used for the accumulation of public capital. Hence, this constitutes a direct test of whether resource rents significantly contaminate the political process of taking public economic decisions. However, until recently such a test has not been feasible because of a lack of appropriate data, so that analysis of whether there is a 'resource curse' has depended upon inference from the higher-level outcomes.
We use a new global panel dataset on public capital and resource rents covering the period 1970 to 2005 and 45 developed and developing countries. We find strong evidence in favour of a curse. We also find that good economic and political institutions limit the curse whereas GDP volatility and ethnic fractionalization magnifies it. Furthermore, precisely contrary to optimal public policy, depleting 'point source' resource rents are more harmful to public capital than resource rents from the potentially sustainable sources of forestry and agriculture. Our main results hold when we control for income, country and time fixed effects, and various additional covariates. They are also robust to instrumental variable estimation using commodity price and rainfall as instruments for resource rents and income respectively, Arellano-Bond GMM estimation of a dynamic panel data model, as well as across different samples and data frequencies.
Our findings have important implications for managing resource revenues in developing countries. To date international policy advice for resource-rich low-income countries has tended to advocate the accumulation of foreign financial assets, for example through Sovereign Wealth
Funds. There are obvious grounds for regarding this privileging of foreign assets over domestic investment as mistaken for low-income countries (Collier et al., 2010) . Our new results suggest that the critical policy error is yet more fundamental: resource rents so warp incentives that politicians actually reduce public investment in their own economies. Hopefully, this manifestly sub-optimal policy choice may be more amenable to influence than the accumulation of foreign reserves, since the need for public investment is readily apparent to ordinary citizens. Commodity Price Index ( it P ): Hamilton and Clemens (1999) estimate international market price for crude oil, natural gas, coal, metals and minerals, and forest to compute rent for use in their calculation of adjusted net savings. We use their estimated international market price of these commodities which is a weighted average of the individual prices with production volume index as weights. Source: Hamilton and Clemens (1999) .
Log Rainfall: Log of Annual Precipitation. This data is approved by the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC). Source: Mitchell et al. (2003) .
Log GDP per capita ( it Y ):
Log GDP per capita PPP (in current international dollars). Source: WDI Online.
Democracy lagged ( 5 it D ):
Lagged average POLITY2 coding (5 year averages) from the Polity IV dataset. POLITY2 is defined as the difference between democracy and autocracy scores, rescaled so that it ranges from 0 to 1 with higher value implying better institutions. Source: Polity IV.
Hall and Jones Institutions Index lagged (
The index is a combined measure of economic institutions. It is the average of five categories (law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of contracts). The index ranges between 0 and 7 with 0 signifying the worst institutional quality. Source: Hall and Jones (1999) .
Executive Constraints: Measure of institutionalized constraints on the power of chief executives, ranging from 1 to 7 with higher values representing greater constraints. Source: Polity IV.
GDP volatility [ Y it
: ]: We construct a GDP volatility series by following a two step procedure. First, we estimate an empirical growth model with investments and population growth as explanatory variables using dynamic panel data estimation technique (Arellano -Bond GMM). Second, we extract the residual from this regression and use the squared residual as our measure of volatility.
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Log (2) tests in residuals are also reported. Note that to pass these tests, one has to reject the null of no AR(1) and fail to reject the null of no AR(2). 
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Log Belsley et al. 1980 ). Here n is the number of observation and k is the number of independent variables including the intercept. The influential observations according to the DFITS formula are EGY1970-1975 , EGY2000, IRL2000, JPN1970, JPN2000, JOR1970-1975 , JOR1995, MYS1970-1975 , MYS2000, MEX1970-1975 , CHE2000, THA2000, USA1970, URY1985, and URY1995-2000. The influential observations according to the Cook's Distance formula are all of the above except MYS1970.
Influential observations according to the Welsch Distance formula are EGY1970-1975 , EGY2000, JOR1970-1975 , JOR1990, MEX1970-1975 , THA2000, URY1985, and URY2000. In column 9, we drop major oil producers Canada, Egypt, Mexico, and Norway from the sample. Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out with an intercept. PIMI implies Public Investment Management Index. 
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